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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BETTY J. NELSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No. 13803

vs.
PERRY A. PETERSON, M.D., and
VALLEY WEST HOSPITAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation, dba VALLEY WEST
HOSPITAL,
Defendants and Respondents.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ARGUMENT
Appellant does not dispute the familiar rules governing
plaintiff's burden of proof in medical malpractice cases. See
e.g. Dickinson v. Mason, 18 Utah 2d 383, 423 P.2d 663 (1967);
Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 347 P.2d 1108 (1959); Huggins
v. Hicken, 6 Utah 2d 233, 310 P.2d 523 (1957); Anderson v. Nixon,
104 Utah 262, 139 P.2d 216 (1943); Edwards v. Clark, 96 Utah 121,
83 P.2d 1021 (1938).

See also Annot., 81 A.L.R.2d 597 (1962).

Appellant contends, however, that her burden of proof was met at
trial in that she established, by expert medical testimony, the

prevailing standard of care in the community, the deviation from
that standard, and that her injuries were probably caused by
said deviation.

Appellant further contends, that even when

the record is read in a light most favorable to the prevailing
parties below as required on appellate review, Paull v. Zions
First National Bank, 18 Utah 2d 183, 417 P.2d 759 (1966), it
is apparent that the jury's verdict of no cause of action is
not supported by substantial evidence.

Appellant therefore

affirms the arguments presented in her first brief and in reply
to new matter set forth in respondents' briefs argues as follows:
POINT I
RESPONDENTS' CONTENTION THAT A
VAGINAL EXAMINATION WAS NOT
NECESSARY UNDER THE PARTICULAR
FACTS OF THIS CASE IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
IN THE RECORD.
Reply to Respondents' Point I.

Defendant hospital's

answer to plaintiff's charge that it breached the prevailing
standard of care by not performing a vaginal examination upon
admission reads as follows:
While Dr. Harris testified that it was the
standard of care in this community to perform
a vaginal examination upon admission, he
admitted on cross-examination that such was
not necessary in this case, since the plaintiff
had had a vaginal examination at her doctor's
office immediately before her admission to the
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hospital,
L<. JUtf.; irier 01 Respuiiaenl xio.- : ;iu. ..
-t In
c, . :*!«.-, Brief of Respondent Physician at 9.
i-r . i;aii J ;' dCi ^-.i i ; uS Limoiij.

n tou... pc;;o. '. - . . .

?;o.-.-, ::" the patient has come to the hospital
directly from the d o c t o r ' s o f f i c e , and he has
p e r f o r m e d an e x a m i n a t i o n of h e r , there would be
n o need for a n immediate e x a m i n a t i o n , would there?

v<

U n l e s s t h e m e m b r a n e s nac r u p i u r e a .
A n a the h o s p i t a l knew or had reason to believe
of "that?
•es.
Respond-.

('.

^OR-r-c.) (Emphasis added.)
. ^.

:

.- • :

D r . P e t e r s o n testified that ^n the absence of
""sections from, the attending p h y s i c i a n , it
a m a t t e r of judgment u p o n the part of the
:. . 'ses as to whether a vaginal exaainaticn
should be done upon admission to the h o s p i t a l ,
and that under the facts of this c a s e , a vacinal
e x a m i n a t i o n w a s not indicated.
(R. 245-24 , V, *'\
T,
3 9 6 , 3S~
ric: of R c r ^ c r / ^ r / Ilc^.r.il o
Even assumin-: *h
peculiar

to
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whether a vaginal examination should oa oor'ormed u' •. \ admission

t: is important t
at that judgment.

determine what ia(iu>!^ .^ ,± invoio : •_ ^loiving
These factors were defined by Dr. Peterson

as : c i^.v'S :
(>

(

i riaht a,a, vou indicated, *" believe. Lint it
we.ild be a m a t t e r of judgment on the part of the
nursing personnel as to whether a vaginal e x a m i n a tion v;as indicated".

t. i V , I ' I

1 ">
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A,

The answer is yes.

Q.

And one of the considerations as to whether or not
a vaginal examination would be indicated or desirable
would be whether or not the patient was complaining
of labor pains, would it not?

A.

That is true.

n#

if the patient was having labor pains, that would
be a consideration pointing to a vaginal examination?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And if they were hard and frequent that would be
a further indication?

A.

Yes, it would.

Q.

On the contrary, if the patient has no such pains
or complaints that would be an indication that one
may not be necessary at this time?

A.

That is true.

Q.

Likewise, if the patient reports that the bag of
waters has ruptured that might be an indication for
a vaginal examination?

A.

Yes, it would.

Q.

Or if it occurred in the presence of hospital
personnel, that might be an indication.

A.

Yes.

Q.

But if the hospital personnel were not aware of it,
that would be another consideration that might
indicate that a vaginal examination was not necessary?

A.

Yes, that is true.

•

(R. 276-77.)

Although plaintiff was not experiencing labor pains when
she entered the hospital, it remains uncontroverted that none of
the nurses even bothered to inquire upon admission whether
plaintiff's water had broken.

(R. 347, 351, 427.)

When

plaintiff was finally asked the question by Dr. Peterson after
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he discovered the prolapsed cord, she reported that the membranes
had ruptured prior to admission*

(R. 281, 392, 394, 427-28.)

This statement formed the basis for several entries to that effect
in the hospital records.

(R. 393-95, 427-28.)

At the conclusion of Dr. Harris1 testimony, the trial
iudge asked him specifically whether the hospital personnel
should have inquired if plaintiff's water had broken:
THE COURT: One other question. Can you state
whether or not the standard of practice in the
community at that time would have required the
hospital people to make inquiry of the patient
upon her admission as to whether the water had
broken.
THE WITNESS: Yes, it would be the standard of
practice to inquire. (R. 318.)
It is apparent and uncontroverted, that the hospital
personnel violated the standard of practice in the community by
not inquiring of plaintiff whether her water had broken upon
her admission.

It is no answer to say that such a question may

not have elicited any reliable information when, according to
defendants1 own testimony, the plaintiff's answer to the question
a few hours after admission was that her water had broken prior
to entering the hospital.

(R. 281, 392, 394, 427-28.)

Since,

according to Dr. Peterson's own testimony, one of the factors
to be considered in deciding whether to perform a vaginal
examination on admission is whether a patient's water has broken
(R. 276-77), it follows that the hospital personnel breached their
duty of care in negligently failing to even attempt to become
aware of this factor before deciding against a vaginal examina-

-5-

tion.

How then can it be argued (Brief of Respondent Hospital

at 10) that under the facts a vaginal examination was not indicated
when the hospital breached its duty to even attempt to ascertain
the critical facts needed to arrive at that judgment?
POINT II
RESPONDENTS1 CONTENTION THAT
APPELLANT'S EVIDENCE OF CAUSATION
WAS MERELY SPECULATIVE IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IN ITS
ENTIRETY.
Further Reply to Respondents1 Point I.

Under direct

examination regarding the issue of proximate cause, plaintiff's
medical expert Dr. John Harris, testified as follows:
Q.

Based on what you found from the file, from your
review of the file, do you have an opinion as to
whether or not that — and this is within the
bounds of reasonable medical probability, I am not
— I will ask you to give me your opinion within
that area. If you have an opinion. Do you have
an opinion as to whether or not had there been a
vaginal examination of Mrs. Nelson performed on
September the 2nd of 1971, at the time she was
admitted to the Valley West Hospital, as to whether
or not the cord would have been determined, the
prolapsed cord would have been determinable at this
time?

A.

I think it would have been likely.

Q.

Now, Doctor, I'd like you to assume some facts in —
strike that. Let me ask one other question here.
In the event, Doctor, that the cord had been
examined, had been discovered, the prolapsed cord
had been discovered upon admission to the hospital,
admission of Mrs. Nelson to the hospital, what
would the proper procedure have been?

A.

The nurse — It would have been possible for the
nurse to push up on the baby's head, relieving the
pressure from this cord. The other possibility
would have been to place the patient in a head-down
position which would have helped to release the
-6-

pressure also. Also to notify the physician of the
state of affairs so that he could come to the hospital.
Q.

Now, with the patient in that position and with
those procedures followed, do you have an opinion
as to how long this child, within the bounds of
reasonable medical certainty, how long this unborn
child could have lived and existed under those
circumstances?
MR. SNOW: You can state that yes or no, Doctor,
as to whether you have an opinion.
THE WITNESS:

I have an opinion.

Q.

(By Mr. Hansen)

And would you tell us what it is?

A.

Had the cord been

—

MR SNOW: Just a moment, please. I am going to
object to that. As I understand the foundation
questions, he was asked whether the prolapsed cord
could have been discovered if there had been an
examination upon her admission. And then if it
had been discovered, the nurse could have either
pushed up on the head, could have placed the patient
in the head-down position and could have called
the doctor. And I now understand this question is,
if those things had occurred, none of which are in
evidence, if those things had occurred, how long
would the child have lived and I object on the
ground there is no foundation in evidence to support
the question. There is no indication of the extent
of the compression or the period of time it had
already been present. There is no evidence upon
which the doctor could do other than speculate
concerning the effect of the nurse pushing up on the
head or the patient going into the position that has
been described. And all of this is, therefore, so
speculative that the opinion would have no foundation or — would in fact not be a competent expression.
THE COURT: He has asked him on the basis of
reasonable medical certainty and if he has an
opinion on that basis, I will let him state it.
THE WITNESS: The fetal heart was taken on admission.
It was normal. So we have some reason to believe
that the compression was not severe at that time.
Therefore, with a palpating cord and a normal fetal
tone rate, it is possible to divert the baby and lift
it off the cord and have a physician arrive at a

-7-

hospital and do a Caesarean section perhaps an
hour later, (R. 301-03.) (Emphasis added.)
Dr. Harris further stated under cross-examination that "Perhaps
75 percent" of the infants suffering from a prolapsed umbilical
cord are saved.

(R. 3 09.)

Although under further cross examination, Dr. Harris
stated that it was "speculative" whether the baby could have been
saved assuming the prolapsed cord had been discovered upon
admission, (R. 312-13), under recross-examination he subsequently clarified what he meant by the word "speculative."
Q.

Dr. Harris, what is the basis of your statistical
comment about 7 5 percent of the infants or fetuses
in which the cord is prolapsed have been saved? Is
there some study of that?

A.

The vast majority of studies have been within the
hospital, patients. Many occur outside prior to
the arrival at the hospital of the patient. So
it must be somewhat speculative, based on in-hospital and out-hospital prolapse.

Q.

But if you confine it to what you have used here
in this hospital record and the basis for much of
your testimony, that is, that your opinion that it
occurred on the way to the hospital, there isn't
any study that would suggest anywhere near 75 percent of those particular kinds are saved, is there?

A.

That anywhere near 75 percent of what?

Q.

Are saved of those particular kinds?

A.

The prolapse occurring out of the hospital,
probably less that 7 5 would be saved.

Q.

Significantly less, isn't that true?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And when you
one of these
that you had
the hospital

say that in response to a question by
gentlemen, in the last few months
an opinion concerning the ability of
people to save the infantfs or fetus1
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life if they had examined the patient upon arrival
at the hospital and had discovered the prolapsed
cord, that assumes, does it not, that the cord has
not been prolapsed and compressed for sufficient
period of time to have killed the fetus?
A.

We know the fetal heart was present on admission.
(R. 314-15.) (Emphasis added.)

It seems clear from the above explanation, that the
75 percent figure used by Dr. Harris was based primarily on
cases of prolapse occuring within the hospital. In the instant
case, however, even though the medical expert testified that
in his opinion the prolapse occurred outside the hospital,
(R. 309) , it is uncontroverted that normal fetal heart tones
were present on admission indicating that "compression was not
severe at this time."

(R. 303). It follows that the instant

case can be viewed as an "in hospital" situation for purposes
of applying the 75 percent successful remedial treatment figure.
According to the rule set forth in the case of
Anderson v. Nixon, 104 Utah 262, 139 P.2d 216, 220 (1943),
in medical malpractice actions it is unnecessary that proximate cause be proved with exactitude; substantial evidence to
support judgment is sufficient.

And as this court stated in

the case of Alvarado v. Tucker, 2 Utah 2d 16, 268 P.2d 986
(1954) , the greater weight of the evidence means "such degree
of proof that the greater probability of truth lies therein."
Id.

at 988. Plaintiff met this burden on the causation issue

by establishing on the basis of reasonable medical certainty
that her injuries were caused by the claimed deviation from
the prevailing standard of medical care in the community.

-9-

CONCLUSION
When the record is viewed in its entirety, it is
clear that plaintiff met her burden of proof by establishing
the prevailing standard of care in the community, the deviation
from that standard, and that her injuries were probably caused
by said deviation.

This burden was met by presenting substantial

evidence through the use of expert medical testimony on each of
the disputed issues in plaintifffs prima facie case.

The jury's

verdict of no cause of action in the negligence suit runs
counter to this substantial evidence and should therefore be
reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

W. Eugene Hansen
G. Richard Hill
HANSEN & ORTON
Beneficial Life Tower,
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
Raymond A. Hintze
Suite #273, Cottonwood
4835 Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah

Suite 2020
84111
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84117
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